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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing (FAS) plays a vital role in face recog-
nition systems. Most state-of-the-art FAS methods 1) rely on
stacked convolutions and expert-designed network, which
is weak in describing detailed fine-grained information and
easily being ineffective when the environment varies (e.g.,
different illumination), and 2) prefer to use long sequence as
input to extract dynamic features, making them difficult to
deploy into scenarios which need quick response. Here we
propose a novel frame level FAS method based on Central
Difference Convolution (CDC), which is able to capture in-
trinsic detailed patterns via aggregating both intensity and
gradient information. A network built with CDC, called the
Central Difference Convolutional Network (CDCN), is able
to provide more robust modeling capacity than its coun-
terpart built with vanilla convolution. Furthermore, over
a specifically designed CDC search space, Neural Archi-
tecture Search (NAS) is utilized to discover a more pow-
erful network structure (CDCN++), which can be assem-
bled with Multiscale Attention Fusion Module (MAFM) for
further boosting performance. Comprehensive experiments
are performed on six benchmark datasets to show that 1) the
proposed method not only achieves superior performance
on intra-dataset testing (especially 0.2% ACER in Protocol-
1 of OULU-NPU dataset), 2) it also generalizes well on
cross-dataset testing (particularly 6.5% HTER from CASIA-
MFSD to Replay-Attack datasets). The codes are available
at https://github.com/ZitongYu/CDCN.
1. Introduction
Face recognition has been widely used in many interac-
tive artificial intelligence systems for its convenience. How-
ever, vulnerability to presentation attacks (PA) curtail its
reliable deployment. Merely presenting printed images or
videos to the biometric sensor could fool face recognition
∗denotes corresponding author
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Figure 1. Feature response of vanilla convolution (VanillaConv)
and central difference convolution (CDC) for spoofing faces in
shifted domains (illumination & input camera). VanillaConv fails
to capture the consistent spoofing pattern while CDC is able to ex-
tract the invariant detailed spoofing features, e.g., lattice artifacts.
systems. Typical examples of presentation attacks are print,
video replay, and 3D masks. For the reliable use of face
recognition systems, face anti-spoofing (FAS) methods are
important to detect such presentation attacks.
In recent years, several hand-crafted features based [7,
8, 15, 29, 45, 44] and deep learning based [49, 64, 36, 26,
62, 4, 19, 20] methods have been proposed for presentation
attack detection (PAD). On one hand, the classical hand-
crafted descriptors (e.g., local binary pattern (LBP) [7])
leverage local relationship among the neighbours as the dis-
criminative features, which is robust for describing the de-
tailed invariant information (e.g., color texture, moire´ pat-
tern and noise artifacts) between the living and spoofing
faces. On the other hand, due to the stacked convolution op-
erations with nonlinear activation, the convolutional neural
networks (CNN) hold strong representation abilities to dis-
tinguish the bona fide and PA. However, CNN based meth-
ods focus on the deeper semantic features, which are weak
in describing detailed fine-grained information between liv-
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ing and spoofing faces and easily being ineffective when the
environment varies (e.g., different light illumination). How
to integrate local descriptors with convolution operation
for robust feature representation is worth exploring.
Most recent deep learning based FAS methods are
usually built upon image classification task based back-
bones [61, 62, 20], such as VGG [54], ResNet [22] and
DenseNet [23]. The networks are usually supervised by
binary cross-entropy loss, which easily learns the arbitrary
patterns such as screen bezel instead of the nature of spoof-
ing patterns. In order to solve this issue, several depth su-
pervised FAS methods [4, 36], which utilize pseudo depth
map label as auxiliary supervised signal, have been devel-
oped. However, all these network architectures are carefully
designed by human experts, which might not be optimal for
FAS task. Hence, to automatically discover best-suited
networks for FAS task with auxiliary depth supervision
should be considered.
Most existing state-of-the-art FAS methods [36, 56, 62,
32] need multiple frames as input to extract dynamic spatio-
temporal features (e.g., motion [36, 56] and rPPG [62, 32])
for PAD. However, long video sequence may not be suitable
for specific deployment conditions where the decision needs
to be made quickly. Hence, frame level PAD approaches are
advantageous from the usability point of view despite infe-
rior performance compared with video level methods. To
design high-performing frame level methods is crucial
for real-world FAS applications.
Motivated by the discussions above, we propose a novel
convolution operator called Central Difference Convolution
(CDC), which is good at describing fine-grained invariant
information. As shown in Fig. 1, CDC is more likely to ex-
tract intrinsic spoofing patterns (e.g., lattice artifacts) than
vanilla convolution in diverse environments. Furthermore,
over a specifically designed CDC search space, Neural Ar-
chitecture Search (NAS) is utilized to discover the excel-
lent frame level networks for depth supervised face anti-
spoofing task. Our contributions include:
• We design a novel convolution operator called Cen-
tral Difference Convolution (CDC), which is suitable
for FAS task due to its remarkable representation abil-
ity for invariant fine-grained features in diverse envi-
ronments. Without introducing any extra parameters,
CDC can replace the vanilla convolution and plug and
play in existing neural networks to form Central Dif-
ference Convolutional Networks (CDCN) with more
robust modeling capacity.
• We propose CDCN++, an extended version of CDCN,
consisting of the searched backbone network and Mul-
tiscale Attention Fusion Module (MAFM) for aggre-
gating the multi-level CDC features effectively.
• To our best knowledge, this is the first approach that
searches neural architectures for FAS task. Different
from the previous classification task based NAS super-
vised by softmax loss, we search the well-suited frame
level networks for depth supervised FAS task over a
specifically designed CDC search space.
• Our proposed method achieves state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on all six benchmark datasets with both intra-
as well as cross-dataset testing.
2. Related Work
Face Anti-Spoofing. Traditional face anti-spoofing meth-
ods usually extract hand-crafted features from the facial im-
ages to capture the spoofing patterns. Several classical lo-
cal descriptors such as LBP [7, 15], SIFT [44], SURF [9],
HOG [29] and DoG [45] are utilized to extract frame level
features while video level methods usually capture dynamic
clues like dynamic texture [28], micro-motion [53] and eye
blinking [41]. More recently, a few deep learning based
methods are proposed for both frame level and video level
face anti-spoofing. For frame level methods [30, 43, 20, 26],
pre-trained deep CNN models are fine-tuned to extract fea-
tures in a binary-classification setting. In contrast, aux-
iliary depth supervised FAS methods [4, 36] are intro-
duced to learn more detailed information effectively. On
the other hand, several video level CNN methods are pre-
sented to exploit the dynamic spatio-temporal [56, 62, 33]
or rPPG [31, 36, 32] features for PAD. Despite achiev-
ing state-of-the-art performance, video level deep learning
based methods need long sequence as input. In addition,
compared with traditional descriptors, CNN overfits easily
and is hard to generalize well on unseen scenes.
Convolution Operators. The convolution operator is
commonly used in extracting basic visual features in deep
learning framework. Recently extensions to the vanilla con-
volution operator have been proposed. In one direction,
classical local descriptors (e.g., LBP [2] and Gabor filters
[25]) are considered into convolution design. Representa-
tive works include Local Binary Convolution [27] and Ga-
bor Convolution [38], which is proposed for saving com-
putational cost and enhancing the resistance to the spatial
changes, respectively. Another direction is to modify the
spatial scope for aggregation. Two related works are di-
alated convolution [63] and deformable convolution [14].
However, these convolution operators may not be suitable
for FAS task because of the limited representation capacity
for invariant fine-grained features.
Neural Architecture Search. Our work is motivated by
recent researches on NAS [11, 17, 35, 47, 68, 69, 60], while
we focus on searching for a depth supervised model with
high performance instead of a binary classification model
for face anti-spoofing task. There are three main categories
of existing NAS methods: 1) Reinforcement learning based
[68, 69], 2) Evolution algorithm based [51, 52], and 3) Gra-
dient based [35, 60, 12]. Most of NAS approaches search
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networks on a small proxy task and transfer the found archi-
tecture to another large target task. For the perspective of
computer vision applications, NAS has been developed for
face recognition [67], action recognition [46], person ReID
[50], object detection [21] and segmentation [65] tasks. To
the best of our knowledge, no NAS based method has ever
been proposed for face anti-spoofing task.
In order to overcome the above-mentioned drawbacks
and fill in the blank, we search the frame level CNN over
a specially designed search space with the new proposed
convolution operator for depth-supervised FAS task.
3. Methodology
In this section, we will first introduce our Central Differ-
ence Convolution in Section 3.1, then introduce the Central
Difference Convolutional Networks (CDCN) for face anti-
spoofing in Section 3.2, and at last present the searched net-
works with attention mechanism (CDCN++) in Section 3.3.
3.1. Central Difference Convolution
In modern deep learning frameworks, the feature maps
and convolution are represented in 3D shape (2D spatial do-
main and extra channel dimension). As the convolution op-
eration remains the same across the channel dimension, for
simplicity, in this subsection the convolutions are described
in 2D while extension to 3D is straightforward.
Vanilla Convolution. As 2D spatial convolution is the
basic operation in CNN for vision tasks, here we denote
it as vanilla convolution and review it shortly first. There
are two main steps in the 2D convolution: 1) sampling lo-
cal receptive field region R over the input feature map x;
2) aggregation of sampled values via weighted summation.
Hence, the output feature map y can be formulated as
y(p0) =
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn), (1)
where p0 denotes current location on both input and out-
put feature maps while pn enumerates the locations in
R. For instance, local receptive field region for convo-
lution operation with 3×3 kernel and dilation 1 is R =
{(−1,−1), (−1, 0), · · · , (0, 1), (1, 1)}.
Vanilla Convolution Meets Central Difference. In-
spired by the famous local binary pattern (LBP) [7] which
describes local relations in a binary central difference way,
we also introduce central difference into vanilla convolu-
tion to enhance its representation and generalization capac-
ity. Similarly, central difference convolution also consists
of two steps, i.e., sampling and aggregation. The sampling
step is similar to that in vanilla convolution while the aggre-
gation step is different: as illustrated in Fig. 2, central dif-
ference convolution prefers to aggregate the center-oriented
gradient of sampled values. Eq. (1) becomes
expand
input feature map output feature map
sampling
central differnce
Conv
aggregation
Figure 2. Central difference convolution.
y(p0) =
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · (x(p0 + pn)− x(p0)). (2)
When pn = (0, 0), the gradient value always equals to zero
with respect to the central location p0 itself.
For face anti-spoofing task, both the intensity-level se-
mantic information and gradient-level detailed message are
crucial for distinguishing the living and spoofing faces,
which indicates that combining vanilla convolution with
central difference convolution might be a feasible manner
to provide more robust modeling capacity. Therefore we
generalize central difference convolution as
y(p0) = θ ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · (x(p0 + pn)− x(p0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference convolution
+(1− θ) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
,
(3)
where hyperparameter θ ∈ [0, 1] tradeoffs the contribution
between intensity-level and gradient-level information. The
higher value of θ means the more importance of central dif-
ference gradient information. We will henceforth refer to
this generalized Central Difference Convolution as CDC,
which should be easy to identify according to its context.
Implementation for CDC. In order to efficiently im-
plement CDC in modern deep learning framework, we de-
compose and merge Eq. (3) into the vanilla convolution with
additional central difference term
y(p0) =
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
+θ · (−x(p0) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference term
.
(4)
According to the Eq. (4), CDC can be easily implemented
by a few lines of code in PyTorch[42] and TensorFlow[1].
The derivation of Eq. (4) and codes based on Pytorch are
shown in Appendix A.
Relation to Prior Work. Here we discuss the rela-
tions between CDC and vanilla convolution, local binary
convolution[27] and gabor convolution[38], which share
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similar design philosophy but with different focuses. The
ablation study is in Section 4.3 to show superior perfor-
mance of CDC for face anti-spoofing task.
Relation to Vanilla Convolution. CDC is more general-
ized. It can be seen from Eq. (3) that vanilla convolution is
a special case of CDC when θ = 0, i.e., aggregating local
intensity information without gradient message.
Relation to Local Binary Convolution[27]. Local binary
convolution (LBConv) focuses on computational reduction
so its modeling capacity is limited. CDC focuses on en-
hancing rich detailed feature representation capacity with-
out any additional parameters. On the other side, LBConv
uses pre-defined filters to describe the local feature relation
while CDC can learn these filters automatically.
Relation to Gabor Convolution[38]. Gabor convolution
(GaborConv) devotes to enhancing the representation ca-
pacity of spatial transformations (i.e., orientation and scale
changes) while CDC focuses more on representing fine-
grained robust features in diverse environments.
3.2. CDCN
Depth-supervised face anti-spoofing methods [36, 4]
take advantage of the discrimination between spoofing and
living faces based on 3D shape, and provide pixel-wise de-
tailed information for the FAS model to capture spoofing
cues. Motivated by this, a similar depth-supervised net-
work [36] called “DepthNet” is built up as baseline in this
paper. In order to extract more fine-grained and robust fea-
tures for estimating the facial depth map, CDC is intro-
duced to form Central Difference Convolutional Networks
(CDCN). Note that DepthNet is the special case of the pro-
posed CDCN when θ = 0 for all CDC operators.
The details of CDCN are shown in Table 1. Given a
single RGB facial image with size 3 × 256 × 256, multi-
level (low-level, mid-level and high-level) fused features are
extracted for predicting the grayscale facial depth with size
32× 32. We use θ = 0.7 as the default setting and ablation
study about θ will be shown in Section 4.3.
For the loss function, mean square error loss LMSE is
utilized for pixel-wise supervision. Moreover, for the sake
of fine-grained supervision needs in FAS task, contrastive
depth loss LCDL [56] is considered to help the networks
learn more detailed features. So the overall loss Loverall
can be formulated as Loverall = LMSE + LCDL.
3.3. CDCN++
It can be seen from Table 1 that the architecture of
CDCN is designed coarsely (e.g., simply repeating the same
block structure for different levels), which might be sub-
optimized for face anti-spoofing task. Inspired by the clas-
sical visual object understanding models [40], we propose
an extended version CDCN++ (see Fig. 5), which consists
of a NAS based backbone and Multiscale Attention Fusion
Level Output DepthNet [36] CDCN (θ = 0.7)
256× 256 3× 3 conv, 64 3× 3 CDC, 64
Low 128× 128

3× 3 conv, 128
3× 3 conv, 196
3× 3 conv, 128
3× 3 max pool


3× 3 CDC, 128
3× 3 CDC, 196
3× 3 CDC, 128
3× 3 max pool

Mid 64× 64

3× 3 conv, 128
3× 3 conv, 196
3× 3 conv, 128
3× 3 max pool


3× 3 CDC, 128
3× 3 CDC, 196
3× 3 CDC, 128
3× 3 max pool

High 32× 32

3× 3 conv, 128
3× 3 conv, 196
3× 3 conv, 128
3× 3 max pool


3× 3 CDC, 128
3× 3 CDC, 196
3× 3 CDC, 128
3× 3 max pool

32× 32 [concat (Low, Mid, High), 384]
32× 32
3× 3 conv, 1283× 3 conv, 64
3× 3 conv, 1
 3× 3 CDC, 1283× 3 CDC, 64
3× 3 CDC, 1

# params 2.25× 106 2.25× 106
Table 1. Architecture of DepthNet and CDCN. Inside the brack-
ets are the filter sizes and feature dimensionalities. “conv” and
“CDC” suggest vanilla and central difference convolution, respec-
tively. All convolutional layers are with stride=1 and followed by
a BN-ReLU layer while max pool layers are with stride=2.
Module (MAFM) with selective attention capacity.
Search Backbone for FAS task. Our searching al-
gorithm is based on two gradient-based NAS methods
[35, 60], and more technical details can be referred to the
original papers. Here we mainly state the new contributions
about searching backbone for FAS task.
As illustrated in Fig. 3(a), the goal is to search for cells
in three levels (low-level, mid-level and high-level) to form
a network backbone for FAS task. Inspired by the dedicated
neurons for hierarchical organization in human visual sys-
tem [40], we prefer to search these multi-level cells freely
(i.e., cells with varied structures), which is more flexible and
generalized. We name this configuration as “Varied Cells”
and will study its impacts in Sec. 4.3 (see Tab. 2). Different
from previous works [35, 60], we adopt only one output of
the latest incoming cell as the input of the current cell.
As for the cell-level structure, Fig. 3(b) shows that each
cell is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of N
nodes {x}N−1i=0 , where each node represents a network layer.
We denote the operation space as O, and Fig. 3(c) shows
eight designed candidate operations (none, skip-connect
and CDCs). Each edge (i, j) of DAG represents the infor-
mation flow from node xi to node xj , which consists of the
candidate operations weighted by the architecture parame-
ter α(i,j). Specially, each edge (i, j) can be formulated by
a function o˜(i,j) where o˜(i,j)(xi) =
∑
o∈O η
(i,j)
o · o(xi).
Softmax function is utilized to relax architecture parame-
ter α(i,j) into operation weight o ∈ O, that is η(i,j)o =
exp(α(i,j)o )∑
o′∈O exp(α
(i,j)
o′ )
. The intermediate node can be denoted
as xj =
∑
i<j o˜
(i,j)(xi) and the output node xN−1 is rep-
resented by weighted summation of all intermediate nodes
xN−1 =
∑
0<i<N−1 βi(xi). Here we propose a node at-
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Figure 3. Architecture search space with CDC. (a) A network
consists of three stacked cells with max pool layer while stem and
head layers adopt CDC with 3×3 kernel and θ = 0.7. (b) A cell
contains 6 nodes, including an input node, four intermediate nodes
B1, B2, B3, B4 and an output node. (c) The edge between two
nodes (except output node) denotes a possible operation. The op-
eration space consists of eight candidates, where CDC 2 r means
using two stacked CDC to increase channel number with ratio r
first and then decrease back to the original channel size. The size
of total search space is 3× 8(1+2+3+4) = 3× 810.
tention strategy to learn the importance weights β among
intermediate nodes, that is βi =
exp(β′i)∑
0<j<N−1 exp(β
′
j)
, where
βi is the softmax of the original learnable weight βi′ for
intermediate node xi.
In the searching stage,Ltrain andLval are denoted as the
training and validation loss respectively, which are all based
on the depth-supervised loss Loverall described in Sec. 3.2.
Network parameters w and architecture parameters α are
learned with the following bi-level optimization problem:
min
α
Lval(w∗(α), α),
s.t. w∗(α) = argmin
w
Ltrain(w,α)
(5)
After convergence, the final discrete architecture is de-
rived by: 1) setting o(i,j) = argmaxo∈O,o6=none p
(i,j)
o ; 2)
for each intermediate node, choosing one incoming edge
with the largest value of maxo∈O,o 6=none p
(i,j)
o , and 3) for
each output node, choosing the one incoming intermedi-
ate node with largest value of max0<i<N−1 βi (denoted as
“Node Attention”) as input. In contrast, choosing last in-
termediate node as output node is more straightforward. We
will compare these two settings in Sec. 4.3 (see Tab. 2).
MAFM. Although simply fusing low-mid-high levels
features can boost performance for the searched CDC archi-
tecture, it is still hard to find the important regions to focus,
which goes against learning more discriminative features.
Inspired by the selective attention in human visual system
Spatial
Attention 
Spatial
Attention 
Spatial
Attention 
Small KernelMid KernelLarge Kernel
Mid-level features High-level featuresLow-level features
Concat
Resize Resize
[MaxPool, 
AvgPool]
Sigmoid
Conv layer
Figure 4. Multiscale Attention Fusion Module.
[40, 55], neurons at different levels are likely to have stim-
uli in their receptive fields with various attention. Here we
propose a Multiscale Attention Fusion Module (MAFM),
which is able to refine and fuse low-mid-high levels CDC
features via spatial attention.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, features F from different levels
are refined via spatial attention [58] with receptive fields re-
lated kernel size (i.e., the high/semantic level should be with
small attention kernel size while low level with large atten-
tion kernel size in our case) and then concatenate together.
The refined features F ′ can be formulated as
F ′i = Fi (σ(Ci([A(Fi),M(Fi)]))), i ∈ {low,mid, high} ,
(6)
where  represents Hadamard product. A andM denotes
avg and max pool layer respectively. σ means the sigmoid
function while C is the convolution layer. Vanilla convolu-
tions with 7×7, 5×5 and 3×3 kernels are utilized for Clow,
Cmid and Chigh, respectively. CDC is not chosen here be-
cause of its limited capacity of global semantic cognition,
which is vital in spatial attention. The corresponding abla-
tion study is conducted in Sec. 4.3.
4. Experiments
In this section, extensive experiments are performed to
demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. In the follow-
ing, we sequentially describe the employed datasets & met-
rics (Sec. 4.1), implementation details (Sec. 4.2), results
(Sec. 4.3 - 4.5) and analysis (Sec. 4.6).
4.1. Datasets and Metrics
Databases. Six databases OULU-NPU [10], SiW [36],
CASIA-MFSD [66], Replay-Attack [13], MSU-MFSD [57]
and SiW-M [37] are used in our experiments. OULU-NPU
and SiW are high-resolution databases, containing four and
three protocols to validate the generalization (e.g., unseen
illumination and attack medium) of models respectively,
which are utilized for intra testing. CASIA-MFSD, Replay-
Attack and MSU-MFSD are databases which contain low-
resolution videos, which are used for cross testing. SiW-M
is designed for cross-type testing for unseen attacks as there
are rich (13) attacks types inside.
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Figure 5. The architecture of CDCN++. It consists of the searched CDC backbone and MAFM. Each cell is followed by a max pool layer.
Performance Metrics. In OULU-NPU and SiW
dataset, we follow the original protocols and metrics, i.e.,
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER),
Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER),
and ACER [24] for a fair comparison. Half Total Error Rate
(HTER) is adopted in the cross testing between CASIA-
MFSD and Replay-Attack. Area Under Curve (AUC) is uti-
lized for intra-database cross-type test on CASIA-MFSD,
Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD. For the cross-type test on
SiW-M, APCER, BPCER, ACER and Equal Error Rate
(EER) are employed.
4.2. Implementation Details
Depth Generation. Dense face alignment PRNet [18]
is adopted to estimate the 3D shape of the living face and
generate the facial depth map with size 32 × 32. More de-
tails and samples can be found in [56]. To distinguish liv-
ing faces from spoofing faces, at the training stage, we nor-
malize living depth map in a range of [0, 1], while setting
spoofing depth map to 0, which is similar to [36].
Training and Testing Setting. Our proposed method
is implemented with Pytorch. In the training stage, mod-
els are trained with Adam optimizer and the initial learning
rate (lr) and weight decay (wd) are 1e-4 and 5e-5, respec-
tively. We train models with maximum 1300 epochs while
lr halves every 500 epochs. The batch size is 56 on eight
1080Ti GPUs. In the testing stage, we calculate the mean
value of the predicted depth map as the final score.
Searching Setting. Similar to [60], partial
channel connection and edge normalization are
adopted. The initial number of channel is sequen-
tially {32, 64, 128, 128, 128, 64, 1} in the network (see
Fig. 3(a)), which doubles after searching. Adam optimizer
with lr=1e-4 and wd=5e-5 is utilized when training the
model weights. The architecture parameters are trained
with Adam optimizer with lr=6e-4 and wd=1e-3. We search
60 epochs on Protocol-1 of OULU-NPU with batchsize 12
while architecture parameters are not updated in the first 10
epochs. The whole process costs one day on three 1080Ti.
4.3. Ablation Study
In this subsection, all ablation studies are conducted on
Protocol-1 (different illumination condition and location
between train and test sets) of OULU-NPU [10] to explore
(a) (b)
(sparsity=0.5)     (U=4, V=3)     (    =0.7)
VanillaConv     LBConv     GaborConv      CDC
Figure 6. (a) Impact of θ in CDCN. (b) Comparison among var-
ious convolutions (only showing the hyperparameters with best
performance). The lower ACER, the better performance.
Table 2. The ablation study of NAS configuration.
Model Varied cells Node attention ACER(%)
NAS Model 1 1.7
NAS Model 2
√
1.5
NAS Model 3
√
1.4
NAS Model 4
√ √
1.3
the details of our proposed CDC, CDCN and CDCN++.
Impact of θ in CDCN. According to Eq. (3), θ con-
trols the contribution of the gradient-based details, i.e.,
the higher θ, the more local detailed information included.
As illustrated in Fig. 6(a), when θ > 0.3, CDC always
achieves better performance than vanilla convolution (θ =
0, ACER=3.8%), indicating the central difference based
fine-grained information is helpful for FAS task. As the
best performance (ACER=1.0%) is obtained when θ = 0.7,
we use this setting for the following experiments. Besides
keeping the constant θ for all layers, we also explore an
adaptive CDC method to learn θ for every layer, which is
shown in Appendix B.
CDC vs. Other Convolutions. As discussed in Sec.
3.1 about the relation between CDC and prior convolutions,
we argue that the proposed CDC is more suitable for FAS
task as the detailed spoofing artifacts in diverse environ-
ments should be represented by the gradient-based invari-
ant features. Fig. 6(b) shows that CDC outperforms other
convolutions by a large margin (more than 2% ACER). It is
interesting to find that LBConv performs better than vanilla
convolution, indicating that the local gradient information is
important for FAS task. GaborConv performs the worst be-
cause it is designed for capturing spatial invariant features,
which is not helpful in face anti-spoofing task.
Impact of NAS Configuration. Table 2 shows the ab-
lation study about the two NAS configurations described in
Sec. 3.3, i.e., varied cells and node attention. Compared
to the baseline setting with the shared cells and last inter-
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Table 3. The ablation study of NAS based backbone and MAFM.
Backbone Multi-level Fusion ACER(%)
w/o NAS w/ multi-level concat 1.0
w/ NAS w/ multi-level concat 0.7
w/ NAS w/ MAFM (3x3,3x3,3x3 CDC) 1.2
w/ NAS w/ MAFM (3x3,3x3,3x3 VanillaConv) 0.6
w/ NAS w/ MAFM (5x5,5x5,5x5 VanillaConv) 1.1
w/ NAS w/ MAFM (7x7,5x5,3x3 VanillaConv) 0.2
Table 4. The results of intra testing on four protocols of OULU-
NPU. We only report the results “STASN [62]” trained without
extra datasets for a fair comparison.
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
GRADIANT [6] 1.3 12.5 6.9
STASN [62] 1.2 2.5 1.9
Auxiliary [36] 1.6 1.6 1.6
FaceDs [26] 1.2 1.7 1.5
FAS-TD [56] 2.5 0.0 1.3
DeepPixBiS [20] 0.8 0.0 0.4
CDCN (Ours) 0.4 1.7 1.0
CDCN++ (Ours) 0.4 0.0 0.2
2
DeepPixBiS [20] 11.4 0.6 6.0
FaceDs [26] 4.2 4.4 4.3
Auxiliary [36] 2.7 2.7 2.7
GRADIANT [6] 3.1 1.9 2.5
STASN [62] 4.2 0.3 2.2
FAS-TD [56] 1.7 2.0 1.9
CDCN (Ours) 1.5 1.4 1.5
CDCN++ (Ours) 1.8 0.8 1.3
3
DeepPixBiS [20] 11.7±19.6 10.6±14.1 11.1±9.4
FAS-TD [56] 5.9±1.9 5.9±3.0 5.9±1.0
GRADIANT [6] 2.6±3.9 5.0±5.3 3.8±2.4
FaceDs [26] 4.0±1.8 3.8±1.2 3.6±1.6
Auxiliary [36] 2.7±1.3 3.1±1.7 2.9±1.5
STASN [62] 4.7±3.9 0.9±1.2 2.8±1.6
CDCN (Ours) 2.4±1.3 2.2±2.0 2.3±1.4
CDCN++ (Ours) 1.7±1.5 2.0±1.2 1.8±0.7
4
DeepPixBiS [20] 36.7±29.7 13.3±14.1 25.0±12.7
GRADIANT [6] 5.0±4.5 15.0±7.1 10.0±5.0
Auxiliary [36] 9.3±5.6 10.4±6.0 9.5±6.0
FAS-TD [56] 14.2±8.7 4.2±3.8 9.2±3.4
STASN [62] 6.7±10.6 8.3±8.4 7.5±4.7
FaceDs [26] 1.2±6.3 6.1±5.1 5.6±5.7
CDCN (Ours) 4.6±4.6 9.2±8.0 6.9±2.9
CDCN++ (Ours) 4.2±3.4 5.8±4.9 5.0±2.9
mediate node as output node, both these two configurations
can boost the searching performance. The reason behind is
twofold: 1) with more flexible searching constraints, NAS
is able to find dedicated cells for different levels, which is
more similar to human visual system [40], and 2) taking the
last intermediate node as output might not be optimal while
choosing the most important one is more reasonable.
Effectiveness of NAS Based Backbone and MAFM.
The proposed CDCN++, consisting of NAS based backbone
and MAFM, is shown in Fig. 5. It is obvious that cells from
multiple levels are quite different and the mid-level cell has
deeper (four CDC) layers. Table 3 shows the ablation stud-
ies about NAS based backbone and MAFM. It can be seen
from the first two rows that NAS based backbone with direct
multi-level fusion outperforms (0.3% ACER) the backbone
without NAS, indicating the effectiveness of our searched
architecture. Meanwhile, backbone with MAFM achieves
Table 5. The results of intra testing on three protocols of SiW [36].
Prot. Method APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%)
1
Auxiliary [36] 3.58 3.58 3.58
STASN [62] – – 1.00
FAS-TD [56] 0.96 0.50 0.73
CDCN (Ours) 0.07 0.17 0.12
CDCN++ (Ours) 0.07 0.17 0.12
2
Auxiliary [36] 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69 0.57±0.69
STASN [62] – – 0.28±0.05
FAS-TD [56] 0.08±0.14 0.21±0.14 0.15±0.14
CDCN (Ours) 0.00±0.00 0.13±0.09 0.06±0.04
CDCN++ (Ours) 0.00±0.00 0.09±0.10 0.04±0.05
3
STASN [62] – – 12.10±1.50
Auxiliary [36] 8.31±3.81 8.31±3.80 8.31±3.81
FAS-TD [56] 3.10±0.81 3.09±0.81 3.10±0.81
CDCN (Ours) 1.67±0.11 1.76±0.12 1.71±0.11
CDCN++ (Ours) 1.97±0.33 1.77±0.10 1.90±0.15
0.5% ACER lower than that with direct multi-level fusion,
which shows the effectiveness of MAFM. We also analyse
the convolution type and kernel size in MAFM and find that
vanilla convolution is more suitable for capturing the se-
mantic spatial attention. Besides, the attention kernel size
should be large (7x7) and small (3x3) enough for low-level
and high-level features, respectively.
4.4. Intra Testing
The intra testing is carried out on both the OULU-NPU
and the SiW datasets. We strictly follow the four protocols
on OULU-NPU and three protocols on SiW for the evalu-
ation. All compared methods including STASN [62] are
trained without extra datasets for a fair comparison.
Results on OULU-NPU. As shown in Table 4, our
proposed CDCN++ ranks first on all 4 protocols (0.2%,
1.3%, 1.8% and 5.0% ACER, respectively), which indicates
the proposed method performs well at the generalization of
the external environment, attack mediums and input cam-
era variation. Unlike other state-of-the-art methods (Auxil-
iary [36], STASN [62], GRADIANT [6] and FAS-TD [56])
extracting multi-frame dynamic features, our method needs
only frame-level inputs, which is suitable for real-world de-
ployment. It’s worth noting that the NAS based backbone
for CDCN++ is transferable and generalizes well on all pro-
tocols although it is searched on Protocol-1.
Results on SiW. Table 5 compares the performance
of our method with three state-of-the-art methods Auxil-
iary [36], STASN [62] and FAS-TD [56] on SiW dataset.
It can be seen from Table 5 that our method performs the
best for all three protocols, revealing the excellent general-
ization capacity of CDC for (1) variations of face pose and
expression, (2) variations of different spoof mediums, (3)
cross/unknown presentation attack.
4.5. Inter Testing
To further testify the generalization ability of our model,
we conduct cross-type and cross-dataset testing to verify
the generalization capacity to unknown presentation attacks
and unseen environment, respectively.
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Table 6. AUC (%) of the model cross-type testing on CASIA-MFSD, Replay-Attack, and MSU-MFSD.
Method CASIA-MFSD [66] Replay-Attack [13] MSU-MFSD [57] OverallVideo Cut Photo Wrapped Photo Video Digital Photo Printed Photo Printed Photo HR Video Mobile Video
OC-SVMRBF+BSIF [3] 70.74 60.73 95.90 84.03 88.14 73.66 64.81 87.44 74.69 78.68±11.74
SVMRBF+LBP [10] 91.94 91.70 84.47 99.08 98.17 87.28 47.68 99.50 97.61 88.55±16.25
NN+LBP [59] 94.16 88.39 79.85 99.75 95.17 78.86 50.57 99.93 93.54 86.69±16.25
DTN [37] 90.0 97.3 97.5 99.9 99.9 99.6 81.6 99.9 97.5 95.9±6.2
CDCN (Ours) 98.48 99.90 99.80 100.00 99.43 99.92 70.82 100.00 99.99 96.48±9.64
CDCN++ (Ours) 98.07 99.90 99.60 99.98 99.89 99.98 72.29 100.00 99.98 96.63±9.15
Table 7. The results of cross-dataset testing between CASIA-
MFSD and Replay-Attack. The evaluation metric is HTER(%).
The multiple-frame based methods are shown in the upper half
part while single-frame based methods in bottom half part.
Method Train Test Train TestCASIA-
MFSD
Replay-
Attack
Replay-
Attack
CASIA-
MFSD
Motion-Mag [5] 50.1 47.0
LBP-TOP [16] 49.7 60.6
STASN [62] 31.5 30.9
Auxiliary [36] 27.6 28.4
FAS-TD [56] 17.5 24.0
LBP [7] 47.0 39.6
Spectral cubes [48] 34.4 50.0
Color Texture [8] 30.3 37.7
FaceDs [26] 28.5 41.1
CDCN (Ours) 15.5 32.6
CDCN++ (Ours) 6.5 29.8
Cross-type Testing. Following the protocol proposed
in [3], we use CASIA-MFSD [66], Replay-Attack [13] and
MSU-MFSD [57] to perform intra-dataset cross-type test-
ing between replay and print attacks. As shown in Table 6,
our proposed CDC based methods achieve the best over-
all performance (even outperforming the zero-shot learning
based method DTN [37]), indicating our consistently good
generalization ability among unknown attacks. Moreover,
we also conduct the cross-type testing on the latest SiW-
M [37] dataset and achieve the best average ACER (12.7%)
and EER (11.9%) among 13 attacks. The detailed results
are shown in Appendix C.
Cross-dataset Testing. In this experiment, there are
two cross-dataset testing protocols. One is that training on
the CASIA-MFSD and testing on Replay-Attack, which is
named as protocol CR; the second one is exchanging the
training dataset and the testing dataset, named protocol RC.
As shown in Table 7, our proposed CDCN++ has 6.5%
HTER on protocol CR, outperforming the prior state-of-the-
art by a convincing margin of 11%. For protocol RC, we
also outperform state-of-the-art frame-level methods (see
bottom half part of Table 7 ). The performance might be fur-
ther boosted via introducing the similar temporal dynamic
features in Auxiliary [36] and FAS-TD [56].
4.6. Analysis and Visualization.
In this subsection, two perspectives are provided to
demonstrate the analysis why CDC performs well.
Robustness to Domain Shift. Protocol-1 of OULU-
NPU is used to verify the robustness of CDC when encoun-
Figure 7. The performance of CDCN on development and test set
when training on Protocol-1 OULU-NPU.
(a) w/o CDC (b) w/ CDC
Figure 8. 3D visualization of feature distribution. (a) Fea-
tures w/o CDC. (b) Features w/ CDC. Color code used: red=live,
green=printer1, blue=printer2, cyan=replay1, black=replay2.
tering the domain shifting, i.e., huge illumination difference
between train/development and test set. Fig. 7 shows that
the network using vanilla convolution has low ACER on
development set (blue curve) while high ACER on test set
(gray curve), which indicates vanilla convolution is easily
overfitted in seen domain but generalizes poorly when illu-
mination changes. In contrast, the model with CDC is able
to achieve more consistent performance on both develop-
ment (red curve) and test set (yellow curve), indicating the
robustness of CDC to domain shifting.
Features Visualization. Distribution of multi-level
fused features for the testing videos on Protocol-1 OULU-
NPU is shown in Fig. 8 via t-SNE [39]. It is clear that the
features with CDC (Fig. 8(a)) presents more well-clustered
behavior than that with vanilla convolution (Fig. 8(b)),
which demonstrates the discrimination ability of CDC for
distinguishing the living faces from spoofing faces. The vi-
sualization of the feature maps (w/o or w/ CDC) and atten-
tion maps of MAFM can be found in Appendix D.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a novel operator called Central
Difference Convolution (CDC) for face anti-spoofing task.
Based on CDC, a Central Difference Convolutional Net-
work (CDCN) is designed. We also propose CDCN++, con-
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sisting of a searched CDC backbone and Multiscale Atten-
tion Fusion Module (MAFM). Extensive experiments are
performed to verify the effectiveness of the proposed meth-
ods. We note that the study of CDC is still at an early stage.
Future directions include: 1) designing context-aware adap-
tive CDC for each layer/channel; 2) exploring other proper-
ties (e.g., domain generalization) and applicability on other
vision tasks (e.g., image quality assessment [34] and Face-
Forensics).
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Appendix
A. Derivation and Code of CDC
Here we show the detailed derivation (Eq.(4) in draft) of
CDC in Eq. (7) and Pytorch code of CDC in Fig. 9.
y(p0) = θ ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · (x(p0 + pn)− x(p0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference convolution
+ (1− θ) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
= θ ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
+θ · (−
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference term
+ (1− θ) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
= (θ + 1− θ) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
+θ · (−x(p0) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference term
=
∑
pn∈R
w(pn) · x(p0 + pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vanilla convolution
+θ · (−x(p0) ·
∑
pn∈R
w(pn))︸ ︷︷ ︸
central difference term
.
(7)
import torch .nn as nn
import torch .nn. functional as F
class CDC (nn.Module):
def init ( self , IC, OC, K=3, P=1, theta =0.7) :
# IC, OC: in channels , out channels
# K, P: kernel size , padding
# theta : hyperparameter in CDC
super(CDC, self) . init ()
self . vani = nn.Conv2d(IC, OC, kernel size =K, padding=P)
self . theta = theta
def forward( self , x) :
# x: input features with shape [N,C,H,W]
out vanilla = self . vani (x)
kernel diff = self .conv.weight.sum(2).sum(2)
kernel diff = kernel diff [:, :, None, None]
out CD = F.conv2d(input=x, weight= kernel diff , padding=0)
return out vanilla − self . theta ∗ out CD
Figure 9. Python code of CDC based on Pytorch.
B. Adaptive θ for CDC
Although the best hyperparameter θ = 0.7 can be manu-
ally measured for face anti-spoofing task, it is still trouble-
some to find the best-suited θ when applying Central Differ-
ence Convolution (CDC) to other datasets/tasks. Here we
treat θ as the data-driven learnable weights for each layer.
A simple implementation is to utilize Sigmoid(θ) to guar-
antee the output range within [0, 1].
As illustrated in Fig. 10(a), it is interesting to find that
the values of learned weights in low (2nd to 4th layer) and
high (8th to 10th layer) levels are relatively small while that
in mid (5th to 7th layer) level are large. It indicates that the
(a) (b)
(Adaptive) (     =0.7)
Figure 10. Adaptive CDC with learnable θ for each layer. (a)
The learned θ weights for the first ten layers. (b) Performance
comparison on Protocol-1 OULU-NPU.
central difference gradient information might be more im-
portant for mid level features. In terms of the performance
comparison, it can be seen from Fig. 10(b) that adaptive
CDC achieves comparable results (1.8% vs. 1.0% ACER)
with CDC using constant θ = 0.7.
C. Cross-type Testing on SiW-M
Following the same cross-type testing protocol (13 at-
tacks leave-one-out) on SiW-M dataset [37], we compare
our proposed methods with three recent face anti-spoofing
methods [10, 36, 37] to valid the generalization capacity
of unseen attacks. As shown in Table 8, our CDCN++
achieves an overall better ACER and EER, with the im-
provement of previous state-of-the-art [37] by 24% and
26% respectively. Specifically, we detect almost all ”Im-
personation” and ”Partial Paper” attacks (EER=0%) while
the previous methods perform poorly on ”Impersonation”
attack. It is obvious that we reduce the both the EER
and ACER of Mask attacks (”HalfMask”, ”SiliconeMask”,
”TransparentMask” and ”MannequinHead”) sharply, which
shows our CDC based methods generalize well on 3D non-
planar attacks.
D. Feature Visualization
The low-level features and corresponding spatial atten-
tion maps of MAFM are visualized in Fig. 11. It is clear
that both the features and attention maps between living and
spoofing faces are quite different. 1) For the low-level fea-
tures (see 2nd and 3rd row in Fig. 11), neural activation
from the spoofing faces seems to be more homogeneous be-
tween the facial and background regions than that from liv-
ing faces. It’s worth noting that features with CDC are more
likely to capture the detailed spoofing patterns (e.g., lattice
artifacts in ”Print1” and reflection artifacts in ”Replay2”).
2) For the spatial attention maps of MAFM (see 4th row in
Fig. 11), all the regions of hair, face and background have
the relatively strong activation for the living faces while the
facial regions contribute weakly for the spoofing faces.
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Table 8. The evaluation and comparison of the cross-type testing on SiW-M [37].
Method Metrics(%) Replay Print Mask Attacks Makeup Attacks Partial Attacks AverageHalf Silicone Trans. Paper Manne. Obfusc. Imperson. Cosmetic Funny Eye Paper Glasses Partial Paper
SVMRBF+LBP [10]
APCER 19.1 15.4 40.8 20.3 70.3 0.0 4.6 96.9 35.3 11.3 53.3 58.5 0.6 32.8±29.8
BPCER 22.1 21.5 21.9 21.4 20.7 23.1 22.9 21.7 12.5 22.2 18.4 20.0 22.9 21.0±2.9
ACER 20.6 18.4 31.3 21.4 45.5 11.6 13.8 59.3 23.9 16.7 35.9 39.2 11.7 26.9±14.5
EER 20.8 18.6 36.3 21.4 37.2 7.5 14.1 51.2 19.8 16.1 34.4 33.0 7.9 24.5±12.9
Auxiliary [36]
APCER 23.7 7.3 27.7 18.2 97.8 8.3 16.2 100.0 18.0 16.3 91.8 72.2 0.4 38.3±37.4
BPCER 10.1 6.5 10.9 11.6 6.2 7.8 9.3 11.6 9.3 7.1 6.2 8.8 10.3 8.9± 2.0
ACER 16.8 6.9 19.3 14.9 52.1 8.0 12.8 55.8 13.7 11.7 49.0 40.5 5.3 23.6±18.5
EER 14.0 4.3 11.6 12.4 24.6 7.8 10.0 72.3 10.1 9.4 21.4 18.6 4.0 17.0±17.7
DTN [37]
APCER 1.0 0.0 0.7 24.5 58.6 0.5 3.8 73.2 13.2 12.4 17.0 17.0 0.2 17.1±23.3
BPCER 18.6 11.9 29.3 12.8 13.4 8.5 23.0 11.5 9.6 16.0 21.5 22.6 16.8 16.6 ±6.2
ACER 9.8 6.0 15.0 18.7 36.0 4.5 7.7 48.1 11.4 14.2 19.3 19.8 8.5 16.8 ±11.1
EER 10.0 2.1 14.4 18.6 26.5 5.7 9.6 50.2 10.1 13.2 19.8 20.5 8.8 16.1± 12.2
CDCN (Ours)
APCER 8.2 6.9 8.3 7.4 20.5 5.9 5.0 43.5 1.6 14.0 24.5 18.3 1.2 12.7±11.7
BPCER 9.3 8.5 13.9 10.9 21.0 3.1 7.0 45.0 2.3 16.2 26.4 20.9 5.4 14.6 ±11.7
ACER 8.7 7.7 11.1 9.1 20.7 4.5 5.9 44.2 2.0 15.1 25.4 19.6 3.3 13.6 ±11.7
EER 8.2 7.8 8.3 7.4 20.5 5.9 5.0 47.8 1.6 14.0 24.5 18.3 1.1 13.1± 12.6
CDCN++ (Ours)
APCER 9.2 6.0 4.2 7.4 18.2 0.0 5.0 39.1 0.0 14.0 23.3 14.3 0.0 10.8±11.2
BPCER 12.4 8.5 14.0 13.2 19.4 7.0 6.2 45.0 1.6 14.0 24.8 20.9 3.9 14.6±11.4
ACER 10.8 7.3 9.1 10.3 18.8 3.5 5.6 42.1 0.8 14.0 24.0 17.6 1.9 12.7±11.2
EER 9.2 5.6 4.2 11.1 19.3 5.9 5.0 43.5 0.0 14.0 23.3 14.3 0.0 11.9±11.8
Figure 11. Features visualization on living face (the first column) and spoofing faces (four columns to the right). The four rows represent
the RGB images, low-level features w/o CDC, w/ CDC and low-level spatial attention maps respectively. Best view when zoom in.
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